process of young people moving into central urban locations during a transitory life phase prior to settling down (Ley, 1996; Rose, 1984) .
Likewise, regional population decline is associated with selective outmigration of the young and upwardly mobile, and the aging of a lower income population left behind (Elshof, van Wissen, & Mulder, 2014; Martinez-Fernandez, Audirac, Fol, & Cunningham-Sabot, 2012) . Fault lines within and between generations, and changes therein, may thus be key in explaining overall socio-spatial divides. This paper therefore sets out to explicitly introduce "age," and agerelated changes, into wider analyses of socio-spatial inequality. It unravels the extent to which aggregate socio-economic changes at both the urban and neighbourhood level are produced by populations of different ages. That is, some age groups may contribute more to total socio-economic change than other groups. Still other age groups may dampen or counterbalance overall socio-economic change (e.g., when overall patterns point to upgrading, whereas downgrading may be dominant among particular age groups). The influence of age groups may also vary across urban space, as patterns of up or downgrading may be driven by different age groups in different locations.
This paper presents a study of the municipality of Amsterdam, the Dutch capital and the nation's largest city with over 800,000 inhabitants. Amsterdam is a booming city characterised by gentrification that has spread across most of the central city and rapidly rising house prices (see Hochstenbach, 2017a) . Despite housing marketisation, Amsterdam remains a city with a relatively large de-commodified social-rental housing stock (around 45% of the housing stock), shielding incumbent tenants from market forces. The paper draws on register data from Statistics Netherlands covering the entire population for the period [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] [2015] . Using spatial and temporal analyses, this paper highlights how and where different age groups influence socio-spatial inequalities, and changes therein over time.
| LITERATURE REVIEW

| Age and residential trajectories
Residential location is closely related to age and life-course position, as well as income and class. It is well established that life-course events trigger residential moves. Households attempt to recalibrate their housing situation to changing needs and desires, and to changes in their own socio-economic position (Clark & Huang, 2003; Musterd, Van Gent, Das, & Latten, 2016) . Major life events like leaving home, coupling, and having children often lead to relocation to a different type of residential environment (Brown & Moore, 1970; Geist & McManus, 2008) . Such moves may be between different municipalities or regions (e.g., urbanisation or suburbanisation), but also within municipalities-between neighbourhoods offering different locational qualities (e.g., good schools or other amenities). The result is a finegrained geography of age and life course, with a mosaic of neighbourhoods fulfilling specific roles for households of different ages (Damhuis, Van Gent, Hochstenbach, & Musterd, 2019; Timms, 1971 ). Age and life-course dynamics are therefore implicated in the production and reproduction of uneven population distributions and socio-spatial inequalities (Bailey, 2009 ).
The residential trajectories of young adults are particularly important in understanding urban change. In many Western countries, young adults often move to the city after leaving home, for education or employment reasons. This propels major interregional population redistributions (Faggian, McCann, & Sheppard, 2007; Fielding, 1992; Imeraj, Willaert, Finney, & Gadeyne, 2017; Smith & Sage, 2014) . Especially young adults from affluent backgrounds and those en route to the middle class try their fortunes in the city, assuring these cities of a steady influx of upwardly mobile newcomers (Smith, 2005) . As university participation has expanded over the last decades, ever more young adults flock to the city.
Although residence in the city remains temporary for many, trends are that young adults stay longer. They prolong a transitory life phase prior to settling down-part of a second demographic transition marked by an increase in single living and a postponement of marriage and childrearing (Lesthaeghe, 2010) . For many young adults, this transitory life phase is distinctly urban (Buzar et al., 2005; Van Criekingen, 2010 ): They postpone their move out of the city or may even choose not to move away altogether (Boterman, 2012; Bridge, 2003) .
For previous generations of young middle-class adults that opted for central-city living, the choice to do so often constituted a rebellious act, and an embrace of progressive values (Ley, 1996) . It meant a rejection of dominant societal and patriarchal expectations of middle-class suburban life and the male-breadwinner nuclear family (Wilson, 1991) . As university participation has continued to expand, labour markets have further clustered in cities and gentrification has become an urban mainstay; this has been subject to change. Now, living in the city has in many ways become standard and expected among young middle-class adults in western countries. They may, for example, have parents who were gentrifiers themselves and now promote similar residential trajectories (Hochstenbach & Boterman, 2017 .
| Age and urban change
Subsequent effects on cities are notable. Young middle-class adults have been key in many cities' return to demographic growth (Buzar et al., 2005; Kabisch & Haase, 2011; Rérat, 2012; Storper & Manville, 2006) . Their presence has especially increased in neighbourhoods that combine proximity to education, amenities, and cultural life with the availability of affordable, often small, rental apartments (Moos, 2016) .
There are close ties to urban class change here as well. From a demand-side perspective, young upwardly mobile adults are key agents in gentrification, especially incipient forms (Ley, 1996; Rose, 1984) .
Class and age also intersect in the case of family households. The mass suburbanisation that took place across cities of the global north during much of the 20th century (and still today) was driven by middle-class families with children able to afford more spacious homes and a suburban lifestyle (Rossi, 1955) . Lower class, often migrant, families remained confined to the cheaper, lower quality, and smaller housing found in North American and European cities (Musterd, 2005; Wilson, 1987) . For various reasons, a growing number of middle-class households remain in the city after having children (Boterman, 2012; Lilius, 2019 )-a structural trend that was temporarily amplified by the global financial crisis as the housing-market downturn led to lower residential mobility rates. As these families are often dual earners able to mobilise ample financial resources, they are important agents of urban upgrading. Specific forms of family gentrification subsequently emerge in specific locations that offer relatively spacious housing, safety, and proximity to good schools (Boterman, 2012; Butler, Hamnett, & Ramsden, 2013; Butler & Robson, 2003) .
Older generations are less often considered in urban change. If at all, they are often depicted as being on the losing side of gentrification: Gentrification may uproot old communities and dissolve neighbourhood networks, contributing to displacement pressures (Newman & Wyly, 2006) . These assumptions particularly apply to blue-collar elderly, who are often thought of as being displaced or replaced by younger and more affluent groups (Hamnett, 2003) . When strong tenant protection is in place, as is the case in Dutch cities, lowincome groups may be able to remain in their neighbourhood into old age, slowing down population turnover and neighbourhood change (Hochstenbach & Van Gent, 2015) .
On the other end of the spectrum, affluent elderly may contribute to specific forms of urban upgrading. For example, postempty nesting or retirement, they may turn to urban living. By and large, homeowning elderly have been relatively successful in accumulating wealth across European countries (Wind, 2017) , which they can put to use to acquire property in up-market areas. New high-end developments may seek to cater to the preferences of such affluent elderly (Rose & Villeneuve, 2006) . Affluent elderly may also invest in second homes-for leisure, their children, or speculative purposes (Arundel, 2017; Hochstenbach, 2018; Paris, 2009 
| Changing generational divides
Links between age, class, and socio-economic position are not static as divides both between and within age groups change. Recently, much attention has gone toward growing inequalities between old and young at country levels. Wealth concentrates among older age groups, as the rate of return on capital has surpassed that on labour (Piketty, 2014) . In addition, especially since the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis, young adults in many countries appear on the losing side of labour-market changes. Studies of European countries and the United States show young adults are, more so than others, confronted with decreased access to employment, stagnant wages, and contract precarity (Bell & Blanchflower, 2011; Hills, Cunliffe, Gambaro, & Obolenskaya, 2013) .
Housing plays a central role in wealth concentration and exacerbating intergenerational inequalities. In countries like the Netherlands, access to secure and affordable rental housing has become more restricted, following the erosion of social-rental sectors (Hochstenbach, 2017b) . Owner occupation has drifted out of reach for growing portions of the population due to long-term house-price increases, and the post-global financial crisis tightening of mortgage lending criteria. This has aggravated housing inequality, not only between rich and poor but also between insiders and outsiders.
Insider-outsider divides frequently run along generational lines:
Especially younger adults struggle to buy a house or find secure independent housing (Clapham, Mackie, Orford, Thomas, & Buckle, 2014; Druta, Limpens, Pinkster, & Ronald, 2018; Forrest & Hirayama, 2015; McKee, 2012) . Consequently, younger adults are barred from accumulating the housing wealth that can help them advance on the housing market (Arundel & Hochstenbach, 2018) . Many older generations of owner-occupiers have, in contrast, benefited from long-term house price gains, which enabled them to accumulate substantial housing wealth (Wind, 2017) . Using this wealth, they are able to outcompete and crowd out younger households from house purchases (Neuteboom & Brounen, 2011; Ronald & Kadi, 2017) . Of course, they may also assist their children in purchasing a house-contributing to the intergenerational reproduction of inequality (Helderman & Mulder, 2007) . The spatial dimensions of growing age divides are rarely considered, but it is to be expected that older age groups will increasingly mobilise their (housing) wealth to buy into expensive areas, outcompeting younger households.
The above has discussed how the social geography of cities is shaped by the intersection between age and class, notwithstanding the important influence of other key variables such as ethnicity and gender. This study seeks to add to this literature in three main ways.
First, the current literature gives little insight into the extent to which contemporary trends of urban change are produced or alternatively mitigated by different age groups. Although some studies have investigated the social geography of, and residential segregation between different age groups (Winkler & Klaas, 2012; Sabater, Graham, & Finney, 2017 ; see also Hagestad & Uhlenberg, 2006) , they rarely consider how age shapes socio-spatial divides between income groups. Second, and relatedly, it is unknown to what extent various age groups may be the key agents of change in different neighbourhoods, and how this adds up to aggregate urban change. For example, the potential coexistence of different age-specific forms of gentrification (e.g., studentification and family gentrification) may help explain the process' expansion-adding to explanations focusing on the role of capital and the state (Hackworth & Smith, 2001 ).
Third, and most fundamentally, studies highlight growing divides between old and young, with the latter on the losing side. It is unknown though how these divides unfold in specific urban contexts. Cities may deviate from nationwide trends, as they are confronted with specific patterns of population aging and selective residential mobility. This may include the aging of a relatively poor incumbent population, as previous decades have seen the suburbanisation of middle-class households, and the selective influx of affluent or soon-to-be affluent young adults. Alternatively, cities may also see an increase in affluent older households, while young adults may especially struggle to advance on the housing market in high-demand urban contexts.
| CONTEXT: AMSTERDAM HOUSING POLICY
Housing policy is central in producing and reproducing urban and socio-spatial inequality (Desmond, 2016; Tach & Emory, 2017) . Likewise, age divides, both within cities and within housing markets, are influenced by both urban and housing policies. There is a wide variety in housing systems, shaping spatial inequalities in various ways (Tammaru et al., 2016) . Broadly speaking, more liberal and market-oriented housing systems are generally associated with higher levels of segregation, accommodating more affluent households' tendency to cluster among peers (Musterd et al., 2016) . This may also lead to greater spatial divides between age groups.
Turning to Amsterdam, we find that the city still hosts a comparatively large social-rental sector (45% of the total stock) despite ongoing housing liberalisation. Marked by comparatively low rents, limited rent increases, and strong tenant rights, the social-rental stock protects insiders. Housing outsiders face exclusion from the tenure due to long waiting lists and low numbers of new allocations due to residential immobility and social-housing sales (Hochstenbach, 2017b) .
The imposition of stricter maximum income criteria in 2011 has furthermore led to the exclusion of middle-income households from entering the tenure. Consequently, the population of the city's social-rental stock is rapidly aging (Musterd, 2014) : Insiders in the social-rental stock stay put whereas particularly young adults face mounting difficulties getting in. Its residents are also increasingly often on a low income, marking the tenure's gradual residualisation (Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 2017).
The private rental sector, some 25% of the total stock in 2015, used to function as an important "landing spot" for a wide range of newcomers to the city due to typically low rent levels and the absence of waiting lists. Steep rent increases render the tenure increasingly inaccessible and unaffordable. After decades of decline, the Amsterdam private rental market has returned to growth post-2008, as a result of newly built developments and buy-to-let investments (Aalbers, Bosma, Fernandez, & Hochstenbach, 2018) . The current expansion of private rent may help some young adults, if they are able and willing to shoulder high rent burdens.
The Amsterdam owner-occupied market has doubled in relative size between 2000 and 2015: from 15% to 30% of the total stock (Hochstenbach, 2017b) First, this paper looks at the changing presence of these different income and age groups in the city over time. It also looks at the combination of income and age in order to get a sense of which age groups are responsible for driving or dampening socio-economic population change. Second, this paper looks at the specific geographies of age and income. To measure and visualise neighbourhood outcomes, this paper uses households' residence address on January 1 of each year. The share of low-income households is highest among households in their twenties, relating to the fact that many of them only recently entered the labour market whereas some may still be studying. Furthermore, in the wake of the global financial crisis, those labour-market entrants are particularly struggling. In terms of change, the share of bottom quintile households increased for those aged between 47 and 65. Among households in their thirties and early forties, the share of low incomes decreased. Shares of low-income households are clearly lowest among those postretirement age. Amsterdam's socioeconomic change is thus very age specific.
| Mapping the geography of income and age
The question is how these various "age-income" groups sort into urban space-and specifically to what extent they reside in neighbourhoods of high status, or in gentrifying neighbourhoods. 
| Neighbourhood typologies
These variegated spatial patterns are reflected in uneven population distributions across neighbourhood typologies. Clear geographies of affluence exist: Only 6.5% of residents living in the least expensive neighbourhood decile have a high income, but this is the case for over 50% of those living in the top neighbourhood decile. These are the city's most expensive and privileged areas. Figure 5 shows how different age groups contribute to these spatial patterns. Although highincome elderly represent only 2.6% of the total Amsterdam population, they constitute over 12% of the total population in the most expensive neighbourhood decile. They concentrate in elite areas to a much greater extent than do other age groups. For example, highincome households in their thirties represent 6.4% of total population, but their shares are relatively constant between 8.6% and 9.7% for the top five neighbourhood deciles.
Spatial patterns are not as pronounced and uneven among lowincome groups. Their shares range from 43.1% in the least expensive neighbourhoods to 18.2% in the most expensive ones. This reflects that low-income groups typically live less segregated than do highincome ones (Tammaru et al., 2016) , as well as the enduring presence of social-rental housing spread across Amsterdam. Interestingly, lowincome elderly are relatively evenly spread across neighbourhood types-ranging from 6.4% to 3.1% of the total neighbourhood-decile population (city average: 5.1%). Stronger differences exist for lowincome households in their thirties and forties, with neighbourhood shares ranging from 9.6% to 2.8% (city average: 5.6%) and from 9.4% to 3.1% (city average: 6.3%), respectively. (from 21.7% to 29.2%). In most deciles, the share of high-income residents increased or remained stable. Only in the lowest gain decile did the share of high-income households notably decrease (−2.6 percentage points). The share of high-income households in their late twenties, thirties, and forties showed a relatively strong increase in the top two deciles. The share of high-income elderly also increased
there, but at a lower rate. These trends suggest that neighbourhood gentrification is mostly associated with these younger high-income groups-contrasting the increasing concentration of affluent elderly in already expensive areas.
The decrease of low-income groups in gentrifying neighbourhoods (−4.5 percentage points in the highest gain decile)
appears mostly driven by a decrease in poor households in their thirties (−3.7), followed by those in their forties (−1.4). These trends partly reflect cohort effects, with the overall share of households in FIGURE 4 High-income households per age group as percentage of total neighbourhood household population in 2015. Source: SSD, own calculations their thirties decreasing, but also pertain to housing exclusion from low-income newcomers and outsiders. The share of low-income elderly particularly decreased in low-gain neighbourhoods, reflecting spatially uneven patterns of population aging (see Hochstenbach & Van Gent, 2015) .
In sum, these patterns and trends reveal the age-specific urban geographies of affluence and poverty, as well as the crucial role of different age groups in driving or mediating population change in different types of neighbourhoods.
| Generational divides
Income position is only one dimension of broader social position.
Inequalities between age groups also exist in terms of insider-outsider dynamics, and the uneven distribution of other financial and nonfinancial resources. Insider-outsider divides on the housing market may, for example, pertain to homeownership access. For the total population, homeownership rates peak among households in their late thirties (41% among 38-year old households).
Lower rates of homeownership among older households relate to the fact that Amsterdam used to be dominated by rental housing: Only since the mid-1990s has the owner-occupied stock rapidly grown opening opportunities for newcomers. Among high-income households, homeownership rates are substantially higher and peak among households in their midforties (around 68%). Also for older highincome households, homeownership rates stand around 60% to 65%.
Wealth is unevenly distributed along the lines of income and age.
Median wealth possessions among the total household population range from −2,000 euros among young households to 17,000 euros among those in their late sixties (Figure 7 ). Differences are much starker among high-income groups, where median wealth possession range from 7,000 euros for young households, to 73,000 euros for those in their midforties, to over 300,000 euros for those postretire- This subsequently structures housing-market position, exacerbating age divides. Wealth position is itself also a product of owning property in these areas. Long-term absolute house-price inflation has been strongest in expensive areas (Arundel & Hochstenbach, 2018) , which translates into stronger wealth accumulation for homeowners in these areas.
| Interpretation of spatial patterns and trends
Findings show notably different spatial patterns and trends between age groups. Simply put, affluent older groups mostly concentrate in to previous waves of (young-adult) gentrifiers themselves, subsequently remaining in place. By staying put, they reduce the opportunities for subsequent generations of young adults to move in, necessitating them to look elsewhere. Especially in high-demand contexts, these dynamics contribute to spillover gentrification toward other neighbourhoods, and thus to the spatial expansion of the process (Hamnett, 2003) . Timing can also be important among lowincome groups: Tenant protection and rent controls may allow lowincome elderly to stay put in their neighbourhood, even as gentrification around them continues. They may also use accumulated waiting time to acquire social housing in high-demand locations.
Third, findings of this paper also show how interventions in the built environment influence how and where life-course trajectories unfold in urban space. Concentrations of high-income households in their thirties, forties, and fifties can be found in urban extensions that were developed in different time periods. More specifically, when they came on the market, these developments absorbed young family households who since then remained in situ.
Fourth, spatial disparities may be influenced by inequalities between age groups. This paper has mostly looked at household income, but other socio-economic dimensions are also important.
Younger households face greater labour-market precarity than do older generations, which translates into a weaker housing-market position. Furthermore, as shown, older high-income households have substantially more assets at their disposal than young adults, which translates into a stronger housing-market position despite potentially similar earnings. Contract and wealth disparities may also have spatial repercussions: Older generations with a permanent contract and substantial housing wealth at their disposal may be able to outcompete younger groups and move into the most expensive housing segments.
This leads to a further divergence in wealth-accumulation prospects.
Changes over time show that affluent elderly indeed increasingly
FIGURE 6
Percentage point change in the share of high-income (top panel) and lowincome (bottom panel) households per age group in house-value change neighbourhood deciles. Source: SSD, own calculations. Note: d1, lowest house-value change decile; d10, highest house-value change decile; see Figure 2 concentrate in the most expensive areas, and younger adults decreasingly so. These trends lend tentative support for the argument that dividing lines between young and old are growing, and that these divides are reproduced in, and influenced by, urban space.
The findings of this paper thus pertain to broader discussions about inequalities both between and within different generationsnot in the least regarding access to housing-and gives new insights into how such divides may materialise in urban space. The findings also have wider relevance regarding the increasing popularity of the urban, explaining how multiple age groups are involved in age-specific urban upgrading. These findings may therefore be generalisable beyond the Amsterdam case study. Yet some of the patterns found may also be rather specific to the Amsterdam or Dutch situation.
The Dutch housing system has a tendency to protect insiders, whereas outsiders may find it difficult to gain entrance. Although not explicitly 
| CONCLUSIONS
This paper has investigated how age dynamics factor into urban socioeconomic change and the social geography of Amsterdam. It shows how such age dynamics play a key role in driving urban socio-spatial change (cf. Bailey, 2009 ). Of course, in producing these spatial inequalities, age intersects with other key dimensions including class, gender, and ethnicity in important ways (Massey & Denton, 1993; Musterd, 2005; Savage, 2015) . In this conclusion, three specific contributions to the broader literature on urban change are highlighted.
First, by placing age centre stage, this paper has given new insights into how aggregate upgrading comes about. Some age groups drive urban upgrading more than others, whereas even other age groups have become poorer overall, thus dampening aggregate upgrading.
For one, particularly the share of affluent elderly has increased, which FIGURE 7 Homeownership rates (%) and median wealth possessions (in euros) along the lines of age in 2015, for the total household population and high-income households (q5). Source: SSD, own calculations may be reflective of the fact that older generations are faring relatively well overall-and on the housing market specifically (Forrest & Hirayama, 2009 , 2015 . Yet also the group of affluent households in their thirties has substantially grown-running counter to expectations of growing intergenerational divides. Their growing presence is likely the product of selective moving patterns as the young and upwardly mobile increasingly flock to the city, for reasons of education and employment. Simultaneously, the decreasing presence of relatively young adults on a low income may signal exclusion. Urban socio-economic change is thus not simply a story of the young and upwardly mobile displacing or replacing an older and poorer population. Instead, aggregate upgrading should be considered the sum of multiple forces at work at different spatial scales-including growing divides between old and young, and interregional mobility flows-tying into each other.
Second, this paper has shown that age dynamics and inequalities are important to understand socio-spatial inequalities in cities, and how they unfold over time. Notwithstanding some commonalities, geographies of affluence and poverty differ substantially between age groups. Whereas affluent elderly concentrate in the most privileged areas, and increasingly so, high-income young adults move to neighbourhoods lower on the hierarchy. These age-specific geographies may be the result of a range of factors, including different residential preferences, temporal and insider-outsider dynamics, the influence of interventions in the built environment on life-course trajectories, and generational divides (e.g., wealth position). Such differences and inequalities materialise in urban space but may also be influenced by space.
Third, at first glance, it may seem that large swaths of cities are undergoing similar processes of gentrification, but a closer look reveals that, in fact, multiple age groups drive different types of upgrading in different neighbourhoods (cf. Hochstenbach & Van Gent, 2015) . To understand how gentrification unfolds, it is key to study the diverse ways in which the process unfolds at the neighbourhood level-with variations of the same process taking place simultaneously in different places. No longer is gentrification a process only driven by young adults. Different age groups are implicated in different forms of gentrification in the city at one point in time. As affluent elderly increasingly concentrate in the city's most expensive locations, they necessitate younger adults to move elsewhere-propelling spillover gentrification.
Together with the push by state and capital (Hackworth & Smith, 2001 ), gentrification's expansion and increasing intensity can be explained by the involvement of multiple generations. An explicit incorporation of such age dynamics thus help us understand how gentrification progresses over time, takes on new forms, and expands into areas previously left untouched.
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